The Anglo-Iraqi War was a British-led Allied military campaign during the Second World War against the Kingdom of Iraq, then ruled by Rashid Ali al-Gaylani who had seized power in the 1941 Iraqi coup d'état with assistance from Germany and Italy. The campaign resulted in the downfall of Gaylani's government, the re-occupation of Iraq by the British, and the return to power of the Regent of Iraq, Prince 'Abd al-Ilah, a British ally.
Mandatory Iraq had been governed by the British since 1921. Prior to Iraq's nominal independence in 1932, Britain concluded the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which was opposed by Iraqi nationalists, including Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. Although Iraq was considered a neutral power under Regent Abd al-Ilah, it had a pro-British government. In April 1941, Iraqi nationalists organized the Golden Square coup, with assistance from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The coup ousted Abd al-Ilah and installed al-Gaylani as Prime Minister. He officially established cordial relations with the Axis powers, prompting the Allies to respond. For the Allies, Iraq represented an important land bridge between British forces in Egypt and British Raj.
Following a series of skirmishes, Allied airstrikes were launched against Iraq on 2 May. The campaign resulted in the collapse of al-Gaylani's short-lived government, and re-installed Abd al-Ilah as the Regent. This increased the influence of the Allies in the Middle East.
After 1937, no British troops were left in Iraq and the government had become solely responsible for internal security.Playfair 1956, p. 177. The Royal Air Force (RAF) had been allowed to retain two bases: RAF Shaibah, near Basra and RAF Habbaniya (Air Vice-Marshal Harry George Smart, also air officer commanding RAF Iraq Command), between Ramadi and Fallujah.Lyman, p. 18. The bases protected British petroleum interests and were a link in the air route between Egypt and British Raj.Playfair 1954, p. 15. At the beginning of the Second World War, RAF Habbaniya became a training base, protected by No. 1 Armoured Car Company RAF and locally raised mainly Assyrian people troops, the Iraq Levies, sometimes known as Assyrian levies.Lake 1999, p. 106.Lunt 1981, p. 42.
In September 1939, the Iraqi Government broke off diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany. In March 1940, the nationalist and anti-British Rashid Ali replaced Nuri as-Said as Prime Minister of Iraq. Rashid Ali made covert contacts with German representatives in Ankara and Berlin, though he was not yet an openly pro-Axis supporter.Youssef Aboul-Enein, Basil Aboul-Enein. The Secret War for the Middle East: The Influence of Axis and Allied Intelligence operations During WW2. pp. 51–54. Naval Institute Press, 2013. In June 1940, when Fascist Italy joined the war on the side of Germany, the Iraqi government did not break off diplomatic relations. The Italian Legation in Baghdad became the chief centre for Axis propaganda and for fomenting anti-British feeling. The Italians were aided in their propaganda efforts by Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who had been installed by the British in 1921. The Grand Mufti had fled from the British Mandate of Palestine shortly before the war, and later received asylum in Baghdad.Churchill, p. 224. In January 1941, Rashid Ali resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Taha al-Hashimi amidst a political crisis and a possible civil war.Playfair 1956, p. 178.
The Golden Square intended to refuse further concessions to Britain, retain diplomatic links with Fascist Italy, and exile prominent pro-British politicians. They thought Britain was weak and would negotiate with them.Lyman, p. 13. On 17 April, Ali asked Germany for military assistance in the event of war with Britain.Lyman, p. 16. Ali also tried to restrict British rights under Article 5 of the 1930 treaty when he insisted that newly arrived British troops be quickly transported through Iraq and to Palestine.Lyman, p. 31.
The air force had 116 aircraft in seven squadrons, of which 50 to 60 were serviceable, and a training school. Most Iraqi fighter and bomber aircraft were at "Rashid Airfield" in Baghdad (formerly RAF Hinaidi) or in Mosul. Four squadrons and the Flying Training School were based in Baghdad. Two squadrons with close co-operation and general-purpose aircraft were based in Mosul. The Iraqis flew an assortment of aircraft types including Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters, Breda 65 fighter bombers, Savoia SM 79 medium bombers, Northrop/Douglas 8A fighter bombers, Hawker Hart (Hawker Nisr) biplane close co-operation aircraft, Vickers Vincent biplane light bombers, de Havilland Dragon biplane general purpose aircraft, de Havilland Dragonfly biplane general purpose aircraft and Tiger Moth biplane trainers. The air force had another nine aircraft not allocated to squadrons and 19 aircraft in reserve.
The Royal Iraqi Navy had four Thornycroft gunboats, a pilot vessel and a minesweeper. All were armed and were based in the Shatt al-Arab waterways.Lyman, p. 26.
At RAF Habbaniya, No. 4 Flying Training School RAF (4FTS) had a miscellany of obsolescent bombers, fighters and trainers. Many of the 84 aircraft were unfit for offensive use. At the start of hostilities, there were about 1,000 RAF personnel but only 39 pilots.Wavell, p. 3438. On 1 April, the British had three Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters used as officers' runabouts, thirty Hawker Audax biplane close co-operation aircraft, seven Fairey Gordon biplane bombers, 27 twin-engine Airspeed Oxford trainers, 28 Hawker Hart biplane light bombers (the bomber version of the Hawker Audax), twenty Hart trainers and a Bristol Blenheim Mk1 bomber. Audaxes could carry eight and twelve were modified to carry two bombs. The Gordons could each carry two 250 lb bombs and the Oxfords were converted from carrying smoke bombs to carrying eight 20 lb bombs. The Hawker Harts could carry two 250 lb bombs. The Hawker trainers were unarmed and the Blenheim departed on 3 May. There was also an RAF Iraq Communications Flight at Habbaniya with three Vickers Valentia biplane flying boats.Lyman, p. 22. At RAF Shaibah there was 244 Squadron with some Vickers Vincent bombers.Lyman, p. 23. The naval forces available to support British actions in Iraq were part of the East Indies Station and included vessels from the Royal Navy (RN), the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) and the Royal Indian Navy (RIN).
On 2 April 1941, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, the new British Ambassador to Iraq, arrived in Baghdad. He had much experience in Mesopotamia and had spent twenty years in the country as the advisor to King Faisal I. Cornwallis was highly regarded, and was sent to Iraq expected to be able to take a more forceful line with the new Iraqi government, but he arrived in Iraq too late to prevent the outbreak of war.
On 6 April, AVM Smart requested reinforcements, but his request was rejected by the Air Officer Commanding, Middle East, Sir Arthur Longmore. At this point in the Second World War, the situation developing in Iraq did not figure highly in British priorities. Churchill wrote, "Libya counts first, withdrawal of troops from Greece second. Tobruk shipping, unless indispensable to victory, must be fitted in as convenient. Iraq can be ignored and Crete worked up later."Thomas, p. 127.
The British Chiefs-of-Staff and the Commander-in-Chief, India, General Claude Auchinleck, were in favour of armed intervention, but the three local commanders (of British Troops in Egypt; in the Sudan, and in Palestine/Transjordan) were already burdened by the ongoing Western Desert Campaign, East African Campaign and the Battle of Greece. They suggested that the only force available was an infantry battalion in Palestine and the aircraft already in Iraq.Playfair 1956, pp. 31, 178–179. The Government of India had a long-standing commitment to prepare an infantry division to protect the Anglo-Iranian oilfields, and in July 1940 the leading brigade of the 5th Indian Infantry Division was ordered to Iraq.Jackson, p. 148. In August, the division was placed under the control of Middle East Command and diverted to the Sudan.Playfair 1956, pp. 177–178. Since then, GHQ India had been investigating the move of troops by air from India to RAF Shaibah.
On 10 April, Major-General William Fraser assumed control over Iraqforce, the land forces from India headed for Basra with orders to occupy the Basra-Shaibah area to ensure the safe disembarkation of further reinforcements and to enable a base to be established in that area. The attitude of the Iraqi Army and local authorities was still uncertain and attempts might be made to oppose disembarkation. Fraser was closely to co-operate with the navy commander. If the landing was opposed, Fraser was to defeat the Iraqi forces and establish a base, but Fraser was not to infringe Iranian neutrality. In early April, preparation for hostilities began at Habbaniya: aircraft were modified to carry bombs, and light bombers such as the Audaxes were modified to carry larger bombs.
On 12 April, Convoy BP7 left Karachi.Lyman, p. 28. The convoy was composed of eight transports escorted by the . The forces transported by the convoy were under the command of Major-General Fraser, the commanding officer of the 10th Indian Infantry Division. The forces being transported consisted of two senior staff officers from the 10th Indian Division headquarters, the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, the personnel of the Royal Artillery's 3rd Field Regiment—without their gunsMackenzie, p. 92.—and certain ancillary troops.Wavell, p. 4093.
On 13 April, the Royal Navy force of four ships in the Persian Gulf was reinforced by the aircraft carrier and two , and . HMS Hermes carried the Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers of 814 Squadron. The naval vessels which covered the disembarkation at Basra consisted of the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, the light cruiser HMS Emerald, the light cruiser HMNZS Leander, the Sloop-of-war , the gunboat HMS Cockchafer, the sloop HMS Seabelle, the minesweeper sloop , and the sloop HMAS Yarra. On the morning of 15 April, Convoy BP7 was met at sea by HMS Seabelle from Basra. Later in the day the escort was reinforced by HMS Falmouth. On 17 April, the convoy was joined by HMIS Lawrence and then proceeded towards the entrance of the Shatt al-Arab. On 18 April, the convoy moved up the Shatt al-Arab and arrived at Basra at 0930 hrs. HMS Emerald was already in Basra. On the same day, HMNZS Leander was released from support duties in the Persian Gulf. On 16 April, the Iraqi Government was informed that the British were going to invoke the Anglo-Iraq treaty to move troops through the country to Palestine. Rashid Ali raised no objection.
On 18 April, the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade landed at Basra, commanded by Brigadier Donald Powell. The 20th Indian Infantry Brigade included the 2nd battalion 8th Gurkha Rifles, 2nd battalion 7th Gurkha Rifles, and the 3rd battalion 11th Sikh Regiment. The landing of the force transported by Convoy BP7 was covered by infantry of the 1st KORRMartin, p. 42. which had arrived the previous day by air. The landing was unopposed.
By 19 April, the disembarkation of the force transported by Convoy BP7 at Basra was completed. On the same day, seven aircraft were flown into RAF Habbaniya to bolster the air force there. Following the landing of the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, Rashid Ali requested that the brigade be moved quickly through the country and that no more troops should arrive until the previous force had left.Playfair 1956, pp. 179–180. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, the British Ambassador to Iraq, referred the issue to London and London replied that they had no interest in moving the troops out of the country and wanted to establish them within Iraq. Cornwallis was also instructed not to inform Rashid Ali who, as he had taken control of the country via a coup d'état, had no right to be informed about British troop movements.Playfair 1956, p. 181.
On 20 April, Churchill had written to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, and indicated that it should be made clear to Ambassador Cornwallis that the chief interest in sending troops to Iraq was the covering and establishment of a great assembly base near Basra. It was to be understood that what happened "up country", with the exception of Habbaniya, was at that time on an "altogether lower priority." Churchill went on to indicate that the treaty rights were invoked to cover the disembarkation, but that force would have been used if it had been required. Cornwallis was directed not to make agreements with an Iraqi government which had usurped its power. In addition, he was directed to avoid entangling himself with explanations to the Iraqis.Churchill, pp. 225–226.
Also on 29 April, the British Ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, advised that all British women and children should leave Baghdad; 230 civilians were escorted by road to Habbaniya and during the following days, were gradually airlifted to Shaibah. A further 350 civilians took refuge in the British Embassy and 150 British civilians in the American Legation.Jackson, p. 149.
By the end of the month, Colonel Roberts and 300 of the 1st KORR had been flown from RAF Shaibah to reinforce RAF Habbaniya.Playfair 1956, p. 182. Other than the 1st KORR, there were no trained British troops at Habbaniya bar the Number 1 Armoured Car Company RAF.
By 1 May, the Iraqi forces surrounding Habbaniya had swelled to an infantry brigade, two mechanised battalions, a mechanised artillery brigade with 12 3.7-inch mountain howitzers, a field artillery brigade with 12 18-pounder field guns and four 4.5-inch howitzers, 12 Crossley Motors six-wheeled armoured cars, a number of Fiat light tanks, a mechanised machine gun company, a mechanised signal company, and a mixed battery of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. This totalled 9,000 regular troops, an undetermined number of tribal irregulars, and about 50 .
British reconnaissance aircraft, already in the air, continued to relay information to the base; they reported that the Iraqi positions on the plateau were being steadily reinforced and that Iraqi troops had occupied the town of Fallujah.
At 11:30 hours, the Iraqi envoy again made contact with Smart and accused the British of violating the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. Smart replied that this was a political matter and he would have to refer the accusation to Cornwallis. Meanwhile, Iraqi forces had now occupied vital bridges over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and reinforced their garrison at Ramadi, cutting off land links to RAF Habbaniya.Playfair 1956, p. 183.
Smart controlled a base with a population of around 9,000 civilians that was indefensible with the force of roughly 2,500 men currently available.Playfair 1956, pp. 181–182. The 2,500 men included air crew and Assyrian Levies, who were prized by the British for their loyalty, discipline and fighting qualities.Len Deighton (1993), Blood, Tears and Folly There was also the possibility that the Iraqi rebels were waiting for dark before attacking. Air Vice-Marshal Smart decided to accept the tactical risks and stick to Middle East Command's policy of avoiding aggravation in Iraq by, for the moment, not launching a pre-emptive strike.Playfair 1956, pp. 182–183.
Still in contact with the British Embassy and with the approval of Ambassador Cornwallis, Air Vice-Marshal Smart decided to launch air strikes against the plateau the following morning without issuing an ultimatum, as with foreknowledge the Iraqi force might start to shell the airbase and halt any attempt to launch aircraft.
By the end of the day, the Iraqi force outside Habbaniya had grown to roughly a brigade.Playfair 1956, p. 184.
On 3 May, the British bombing of the Iraqis continued; troop and gun positions on the plateau were targeted as well as the supply line to Baghdad. The Iraqi air base at Rashid was also attacked and an Iraqi Savoia SM 79 bomber heading for Habbaniya was intercepted and shot down. The following day further air attacks were carried out on Iraqi troop positions and the Iraqi air force. A bombing raid conducted by eight Wellington bombers on Rashid was briefly engaged by Iraqi fighters, but no losses were suffered. Bristol Blenheims escorted by Hawker Hurricane also conducted strafing attacks against airfields at Baghdad, Rashid and Mosul.
On 5 May, due to a car accident, Air Vice-Marshal Smart was evacuated to Basra and then to India. Colonel Roberts assumed de facto command of the land operations at RAF Habbaniya after the departure of Smart.Lyman, p. 19. Air Vice-Marshal John D'Albiac, from Greece, was to take command over aerial forces at HabbaniyaPlayfair 1956, p. 188. and of all RAF forces in Iraq. Further aerial attacks were conducted against the plateau during the day, and following nightfall Colonel Roberts ordered a sortie by the King's Own Royal Regiment (1st KORR) against the Iraqi positions on the plateau. The attack was supported by the Assyrian levies, some RAF armoured cars, and two First World War-era 4.5-inch howitzers which had had previously been decorating the entrance of the base's officers' mess. The guns were put in working order by some British gunners.
The investment of Habbaniya, by Iraqi forces, had come to an end. The British garrison had suffered 13 men killed, 21 badly wounded, and four men suffering battle fatigue. The garrison had inflicted between 500 and 1000 casualties on the besieging force, and taken many prisoners. On 6 May alone, 408 Iraqi troops were captured. The Chiefs-of-Staff now ordered that it was essential to continue to hit the Iraqi armed forces hard by every means available while avoiding direct attacks on the civilian population. The British objective was to safeguard British interests from Axis intervention in Iraq, to defeat the rebels, and to discredit Rashid's government.Playfair 1956, p. 186.
Your vigorous and splendid action has largely restored the situation. We are all watching the grand fight you are making. All possible aid will be sent. Keep it up!Churchill, p. 230.
Over the course of the next few days the RAF, from Habbaniya and Shaibah, effectively eliminated the Iraqi air force. However, from 11 May, German Air Force ( Luftwaffe) aircraft took the place of the Iraqi aircraft.
On 3 May, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop persuaded German dictator Adolf Hitler to secretly return Dr. Fritz Grobba to Iraq to head up a diplomatic mission to channel support to the Rashid Ali regime. The British quickly learned of the German arrangements through intercepted Italian diplomatic transmissions.Lyman, p. 63.
Vichy France, which controlled the neighbouring Mandatory Syrian Republic, became keen to facilitate any agreement between Iraq, Italy and Germany.Sutherland & Canwell, p. 34. Key Vichy figure Admiral Darlan was fully supportive of agreements with the Germans in order to promote long-term French aims, and had become increasingly incensed by British naval attacks on Vichy shipping, which sometimes brought the Royal Navy into direct confrontation with Vichy military forces. It was therefore proposed that Axis access to Iraq would be facilitated via French-held Syria.
On 6 May, in accordance with the Paris Protocols, Germany concluded a deal with the Vichy French government to release war materials, including aircraft, from sealed stockpiles in Syria and transport them to the Iraqis. The French also agreed to allow passage of other weapons and material as well as loaning several airbases in northern Syria, to Germany, for the transport of German aircraft to Iraq.Playfair 1956, pp. 194–195. Between 9 May and the end of the month, about one-hundred German and about twenty Italian aircraft landed on Syrian airfields.Churchill, p. 288. Darlan had actually ensured that the Protocols included a proposal that the French would launch an offensive against the British-held Iraqi oilfields, and the oil would be made available to the Germans.Sutherland & Canwell, p. 35.
Major Axel von Blomberg was sent to Iraq with Sonderstab F ("Special Staff F"), the German military mission commanded by General Hellmuth Felmy. He was to command a Brandenburgers reconnaissance group in Iraq that was to precede Fliegerführer Irak.Kurowski, p. 131. He was also tasked with integrating Fliegerführer Irak with Iraqi forces in operations against the British. On 15 May, he flew from Mosul to Baghdad. On its approach to Baghdad, the aircraft was engaged by Iraqi ground fire, and von Blomberg was killed.Lyman, p. 65.
At this time Germany and the Soviet Union were still allies due to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, and this was reflected in Soviet actions regarding Iraq. On 12 May, the Soviet Union recognised Rashid Ali's "National Defence Government." Time magazine, 30 June 1941. An Iraqi-Soviet exchange of notes established diplomatic relations between the two governments. New York Times, 18 May 1941, p. 6.
On 14 May, according to Winston Churchill, the RAF was authorised to act against German aircraft in Syria and on Vichy French airfields.Churchill, p. 289. On the same day, two over-laden Heinkel 111 bombers were left in Palmyra in central Syria because they had damaged rear wheels. British fighters entered French air space and strafed and disabled the damaged Heinkels. On 15 May an attack was made on German aircraft on the ground at Damascus, killing a French officer in the process.Sutherland & Canwell, p. 40.
By 18 May, Junck's force had been whittled down to 8 Messerschmitt Bf 110 fighters, 4 Heinkel He 111 bombers, and 2 Junkers Ju 52 transports. This represented roughly a 30 per cent loss of his original force. With few replacements available, no spares, poor fuel, and aggressive attacks by the British, this rate of attrition did not bode well for Fliegerführer Irak. Indeed, near the end of May, Junck had lost 14 Messerschmitts and 5 Heinkels.Lyman, pp. 66–68. On 18 May four Vichy Morane 406s chased British aircraft flying above Syria, and another three Moranes attacked British Bristol Blenheims near Damascus without causing damage.Sutherland & Canwell, p. 41. On 19 May another British aerial attack near Damascus damaged several French aircraft and wounded a French soldier, and on 20 May British aircraft intentionally shot up six French aircraft and fifty vehicles.Sutherland & Canwell, p. 42.
More dogfights between Vichy and British aircraft took place on 24 May, as well as a British sabotage mission by 13 on the Aleppo-Mosul railway line, which led to a French armoured car firing on the British.Sutherland & Canwell, p. 43. Further British-French aerial combat occurred on 28 May, in which a Blenheim was shot down by a French fighter, killing its crew. On the same day, French Morane fighters escorted four Nazi Ju 52s near Nerab in eastern Syria. More Vichy-British aerial combat occurred on 31 May.Sutherland & Canwell, p. 44.
Britain was incensed that Vichy had assisted Italy and Germany in their attacks on the British in Iraq, which would not have been possible save for the connivance of the Vichy French.Sutherland & Canwell, pp. 34–39. The Vichyite actions ensured Britain began preparing for an invasion of Syria, which ultimately led to the Syria-Lebanon campaign of June and July.
Plans were drawn up to supply troops, but the German high command was hesitant and required the permission of Turkey for passage. In the end the Luftwaffe found conditions in Iraq intolerable, as spare parts were not available, and the quality of aircraft fuel was far below the Luftwaffe's requirements. With each passing day fewer aircraft remained serviceable, and ultimately all Luftwaffe personnel were evacuated on the last remaining Heinkel He 111.
By the end of the first day of airstrikes, there had been reports that elements of the Royal Iraqi Army were advancing on the town of Rutbah. C Company of the 1st Battalion The Essex Regiment were ordered to travel from Palestine to H4, between Haifa and Iraq; from here the company would join a detachment of RAF armoured cars and defend the position from the Iraqi rebels.Martin, pp. 42–43.
On 4 May, Churchill ordered Wavell to dispatch a force from Palestine.Lyman, p.16. On 5 May, Wavell was placed in command of operations in northern Iraq, and General Maitland Wilson was called back from Greece to take command of forces in Palestine and Transjordan. The Defence Committee and chiefs-of-staff rationale for taking military action against the Iraqi rebels was that they needed to secure the country from Axis intervention, and considered Rashid Ali to have been conspiring with the Axis powers.Playfair 1956, pp. 184–185. The Chiefs-of-Staff accepted full responsibility for the dispatch of troops to Iraq.
On 8 May a column of the Arab Legion, under Glubb Pasha, reached the fort at Rutbah.Young, p. 7. They picketed the ground surrounding the fort, to await the RAF bombardment. The fort was defended by approximately 100 policemen, mostly Iraqi Desert Police.de Chair, p. 18. The H4-based Blenheims of 203 Squadron arrived and bombed the fort and, thinking that it had surrendered, left. The fort had not surrendered, and the RAF returned twice that day to bomb the fort without success.
The next day, the RAF continued to bomb the fort intermittently. One plane sustained such heavy small-arms fire that it crashed on the way home, killing the pilot. That evening, 40 trucks armed with machine guns arrived at the fort to reinforce the garrison. Half of the trucks were irregulars under the command of Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the other half were Iraqi Desert Police. Glubb decided to withdraw the troops back to H3 to await the reinforcement of the main column.
The Arab Legion returned to H3 on the morning of 10 May, and found No. 2 Armoured Car Company RAF under Squadron Leader Michael Casano waiting there. They had been sent up ahead of the main column to assist the Arab Legion in taking Rutbah. Casano took his RAF armoured cars to Rutbah whilst the Arab Legion replenished their supplies at H3. Casano's armoured cars fought an action against al-Qawuqji's trucks for most of the rest of the day and, although the result was not decisive, the trucks retired to the east under the cover of darkness, leaving the garrison to its fate. That night the RAF succeeded in a night bombing, with several bombs landing inside the fort.
Following the withdrawal of al-Qawuqji's trucks and the successful bombing by the RAF, the garrison withdrew from the fort under the cover of darkness. In the morning the Arab Legion column arrived and garrisoned the fort whilst Casano's armoured cars continued to fight remnants of the Iraqi Desert Police's forces.Glubb, pp. 263–267.
After the TJFF refused to enter Iraq that Clark decided to divide Habforce into two columns.Martin, p. 44. The first column was a flying column codenamed Kingcol. Kingcol was named after its commanding officer, Brigadier James Kingstone, and was composed of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, two companies of the 1st battalion The Essex Regiment, the Number 2 Armoured Car Company RAF, and 237 Field Battery of 25 pounder howitzers from 60th (North Midland) Field Regiment, Royal Artillery.Martin, pp. 44–45. The second column, the Habforce main force, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Nichols, was composed of the remaining elements of the 1st battalion The Essex Regiment, the remainder of the 60th Field Regiment, RA, one anti-tank battery, and ancillary services. In addition to Kingcol and the Habforce main force, there was available to Major-General Clark a 400-man strong detachment of the Arab Legion ( al-Jaysh al-Arabī)Martin, p. 45. in Transjordan. The Arab Legion consisted of three mechanised squadrons transported in a mixture of civilian Ford trucks and equipped with home-made armoured cars.Lyman, p. 55. Unlike the TJFF, the Arab Legion was not part of the British Army but was the regular Army of Transjordan, commanded by Lieutenant-General John Bagot Glubb, also known as "Glubb Pasha."Lyman, pp. 54–55.
In the week following the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces near Habbaniya, Colonel Roberts formed what became known as the Habbaniya Brigade, formed by grouping the 1st battalion The Essex Regiment from Kingcol with further infantry reinforcements that had arrived from Basra, the 2nd battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles, and some light artillery.Lyman, p. 69.
During the night of 17–18 May, elements of the Gurkha battalion, a company of RAF Assyrian Levies, RAF Armoured Cars and some captured Iraqi howitzers crossed the Euphrates using improvised cable ferries. They crossed the river at Sin el Dhibban and approached Fallujah from the village of Saqlawiyah. During the early hours of the day, one company of the 1st battalion KORR were air-transported by 4 Valentias and landed on the Baghdad road beyond the town near Notch Fall. A company of RAF Assyrian Levies, supported by artillery from Kingcol, was ordered to secure the bridge across the river. Throughout the day the RAF bombed positions in the town and along the Baghdad road, avoiding a general bombardment of the town because of the civilian population. On 19 May 57 aircraft bombarded Iraqi positions within and around Fallujah, dropping ten tons of bombs in 134 sorties.Lyman, p. 75.
During the afternoon a ten-minute bombardment of Iraqi trenches near the bridge was made before the Assyrian Levies advanced, covered by artillery fire. Facing little opposition they captured the bridge within 30 minutes; they were then met by an Iraqi envoy who offered the surrender of the garrison and the town. 300 prisoners were taken, with no British casualties.Lyman, p. 74.Martin, pp. 49–50.Playfair 1956, p. 189. The Luftwaffe responded to the British capture of the city by attacking the Habbaniya airfield, destroying and damaging several aircraft and inflicting a number of casualties.Playfair 1956, p. 191. On 18 May, Major-General Clark and AVM D'Albiac arrived in Habbaniya by air, but determined not to interfere with the ongoing operations of Colonel Roberts. On 21 May, having secured Fallujah, Roberts returned to Shaibah and to his duties with the 10th Indian Infantry Division.
On 8 May, control of operations in Iraq was passed, from Auchinleck in New Delhi, to Wavell's Middle East Command.Mackenzie, p. 97. Lieutenant-General Edward Quinan arrived from India to replace Fraser as commander of Iraqforce. Quinan's immediate task was to secure Basra as a base. He was ordered by Wavell not to advance north until the co-operation of the local tribes was fully assured. Quinan could also not contemplate any move north for three months on account of the flooding of the Tigris and Euphrates.Mackenzie, pp. 101–102.
Directives were issued to Quinan prior to his assuming command. On 2 May, he had been directed as follows: "(a) Develop and organise the port of Basra to any extent necessary to enable such forces, our own or Allied, as might be required to operate in the Middle East including Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, to be maintained. (b) Secure control of all means of communication, including all aerodromes and landing grounds in Iraq, and develop these to the extent requisite to enable the Port of Basra to function to its fullest capacity." Quinan was further instructed to "begin at once to plan a system of defences to protect the Basra Base against attack by armoured forces supported by strong air forces, and also to be ready to take special measures to protect: (i) Royal Air Force installations and personnel at Habbaniya and Shaiba. (ii) The lives of British subjects in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq. (iii) The Kirkuk oilfields and the pipe line to Haifa." Lastly, Quinan was directed "to make plans to protect the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's installations and its British employees in South West Iran if necessary." Quinan was informed that "it was the intention to increase his force up to three infantry divisions and possibly also an armoured division, as soon as these troops could be despatched from India."
At least two British accounts of the conflict praised the efforts of the air and ground forces at RAF Habbaniya. According to Churchill, the landing of the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade at Basra on 18 April was "timely", and in his opinion had forced Rashid Ali into premature action. He added that the "spirited defence" of Habbaniya by the Flying School was a "prime factor" in British success.Churchill, pp. 235–236. Wavell wrote that the "gallant defence" of Habbaniya and the bold advance of Habforce discouraged the Iraqi Army, while the Germans in their turn were prevented from sending further reinforcements by "the desperate resistance of our troops in Crete, and their crippling losses in men and aircraft."
On 18 June, Lieutenant-General Quinan was given command of all British and Commonwealth forces in Iraq. Before this, Iraqforce was more or less limited to the forces landed at and advancing from Basra.
After the Anglo-Iraq War, elements of Iraqforce (known as Iraq Command from 21 June) were used to attack the Vichy French-held Mandate of Syria during the Syria-Lebanon campaign, which started 8 June and ended 14 July. Iraq Command (known as Persia and Iraq Force (Paiforce from 1 September) was also used to attack Persia during the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Persia, which took place in August to September 1941. Forward defences against a possible German invasion from the north through the Caucasus were created in 1942, and the strength of Paiforce peaked at the equivalent of over 10 brigades before the Russians halted the German threat at the Battle of Stalingrad. After 1942, Iraq and Persia were used to Persian Corridor to the Soviet Union, and the British military presence became mainly lines of communication troops.
On 20 June, Churchill told Wavell that he was to be replaced by Auchinleck.Mead 2007, p. 476. Of Wavell, Auchinleck wrote: "In no sense do I wish to infer that I found an unsatisfactory situation on my arrival – far from it. Not only was I greatly impressed by the solid foundations laid by my predecessor, but I was also able the better to appreciate the vastness of the problems with which he had been confronted and the greatness of his achievements, in a command in which some 40 different languages are spoken by the British and Allied Forces."Auchinleck, p. 4215.
British forces remained in Iraq until 26 October 1947, and the country remained effectively under British control. The British considered the occupation of Iraq necessary to ensure that access to its strategic oil resources was maintained. On 18 August 1942, General Maitland Wilson was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Persia and Iraq Command. By 15 September, he was headquartered in Baghdad. Wilson's primary task was "to secure at all costs from land and air attack the oil fields and oil installations in Persia and Iraq." His secondary task was "to ensure the transport from the Persian Gulf ports of supplies to Russia to the maximum extent possible without prejudicing his primary task."Wilson, p. 4333.
While Rashid Ali and his supporters were in alliance with the Fascist Regime in Italy"Italy and Saudi Arabia confronting the challenges of the XXI century" p. 20. the war demonstrated that Iraq's independence was at best conditional on British approval of the government's actions. Rashid Ali and the Mufti of Jerusalem fled to Persia, then to Turkey, then to Italy, and finally to Berlin, Germany, where Ali was welcomed by Hitler as head of the Iraqi government-in-exile.
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